**1.** Neg must explicitly propose all T interpretations about my advocacy such as specification and implementation as well as metatheoretical concerns and give me the chance to comply to prevent norm creation based on ambiguity and allow the aff to rectify possible abuse to encourage better substantive debate else assume I meet.

**2.** The aff advocacy text is that the maxim of a living wage ought to be adopted as a general principle. Anker 11 defines the common features of a living wage[[1]](#footnote-0):

Section 6 included over **60 descriptions of living wage** as well as tables indicating characteristics of **86** recent **municipal living wage laws** in the United States **and 99 national minimum wage laws** from around the world. These descriptions **provided** a wide range of views which made it possible to draw **general conclusions** that would not have been possible based on the relatively few methodologies and formulas available**.** Readers are referred to Section 6k for a summary of conclusions with some of these repeated below. 1. Living wage is considered a right by the international community of nations. 2. **Living wage should** be sufficient to **support a basic standard of living** that is **considered decent for a specific time and place.** Several descriptions for developing countries mention basic needs. The acceptable basic standard, however, increases with economic development. 3. Living standard supported by **a living wage should provide for more than just** the necessities of life (**food, shelter and clothing**)**.** Some **descriptions**, for example, **refer to health care, education, transportation** and **recreation**; others refer to the need for **savings** or some **discretionary income.** 4. Living wage is a family concept. **A worker should be able to support a family on a living wage.** Most descriptions do not mention exact numbers for number of persons a living wage should be able to support or the number of persons who should provide support. 6. A basic living standard needs to be supported on take-home pay. Descriptions for high-income countries are generally concerned with taxes, **and** some descriptions for developing countries are concerned with mandatory deductions from pay. 7. Descriptions for developing countries often mention that **a living wage needs to be earned in normal work hours** because of concern with overtime abuse

**So,** I defend the intent to provide people with a basic standard of living, consequences are irrelevant to my position so I will accept neg preferences on specificity and implementation as long as they don't require me to abandon my maxim.

**3.** *The role of the judge and ballot is to vote for the debater who best defends the truth or falsity of the resolution on a post fiat level. Aff gets reasonable role of ballot choice for time skew as the neg’s changing of the role of the ballot destroys 6 minutes of AC offense, its too late for a full restart in the 1ar.*

***Next,*** There is a distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is observational information that is simply apprehended. Practical knowledge, in contrast, is productive of reality. One’s judgments leads one to act in a certain way, which then allows one to know how they acted. Haase[[2]](#footnote-1)

Now, our kitchen scene suggests that the kind of cognitive advance sketched above can be made in the first person perspective of acting. **When I answer** your question **how I know that the spatula is in the left drawer by saying ‘I put it there’, I** seem to **claim that** in this case **I was epistemically excluding all those possibilities by determining reality accordingly – that is, through my actualizing my power to move things:** I intentionally went, step by step, through the motions until there was no space for possible interference anymore. Our topic seems to be connected with what the tradition calls **‘practical’** or ‘spontaneous’ **knowledge**. It is said to **differ[s] from ‘theoretical’** or ‘receptive’ **knowledge through the way in which it relates to its object. While theoretical knowledge depends on the reality of its object, practical knowledge is productive of the reality of its object.**16As knowledge in general is the self-conscious exclusion of the possibility of things being otherwise, **practical knowledge is understanding of necessity: in ‘producing’ the reality of its object practical knowledge is knowledge of why this reality comes about;** it is, to quote the famous line G.E.M. Anscombe takes from Aquinas, knowledge that is “the cause of what it understands”.

To clarify, theoretical knowledge is passive. One simply observes relevant features of the action or object. Practical knowledge is active in the sense that your relation to the object of consideration is productive of reality. You act a certain way, so that the reality is not independent of you. Practical knowledge uniquely requires a normative assessment. Theoretical knowledge simply observes whether something exists or is the case. Practical knowledge, in contrast, further asks whether that something should exist.

This distinction is fundamental to moral agency. Without correctly applying the distinction between theoretical and practical judgments, you do not understand the cases where you relate to the world as an agent rather than an observer. *Agents can be alienated from reality when they treat reality as theoretical when it is in fact practical. When agents create institutions because of our normative judgments, and yet treat those institutions as if their existence is purely theoretical, they are alienated from understanding and structuring those institutions properly.*

And, this problem of alienation outweighs. 1) A morally responsible agent should question a practical institution for not just why it exists but whether it should exist. And, similarly, engaging practically with a purely theoretical institution is simply misguided. Without understanding this distinction, moral agency simply collapses to nihilism as notions of moral responsibility or culpability are incoherent. 2) My framework indicates that you can’t hold a conception of action without nonalienation. Thus, nonalienation is a prior question as something being an action precludes evaluations of goodness or badness. Else, the neg’s ethic would just be making a category error of trying to apply moral prescriptions to a non-action. This is necessarily absurd since there is nothing normative to regulate. Without the AC distinction, there is no concept of action; we lack even the idea of what a category that morality applies to even looks like.

Thus, the AC constructs the most fundamental constraint on the nature of action. No valid moral theory could allow us to take up a principle that violates this distinction since it would deny its own object: namely, that of evaluating the goodness or badness of an action. Thus, the AC comes as a prerequisite to evaluating the truth of moral statements.

Thus the standard is **preventing alienation**. Prefer,

First, in order to pass an assessment on moral action, it must be the case that actions can be distinguished from movement. The characteristic component of action is intentionality, yet an alienated view yields a problem for action, as it cannot distinguish between mere wishes and intentions. Small[[3]](#footnote-2)

**Aspiring to do something differs from merely wishing** for some state of affairs or event to obtain or transpire. As Anscombe notes, **“[a] chief mark of an idle wish is that a man does nothing**—whether he could or no—**towards the fulfilment of the wish”** (63, §36).Even though **a mere** or idle **wish** represents its object as in some sense good, it **does not amount to practical thought because it has no inner tendency towards action, which is what practical thought is ultimately for.**³²By contrast, just as an intention has the inner tendency to further articulate and re-articulate itself in action, so an aspiration has the inner tendency to articulate itself such that it becomes an intention. This articulation too is the work of practical reasoning: **an agent’s aspiration can become an intention, by his coming up with a plan**—by reasoning from the end which is at a distance, to an immediate means that he can take. **This inner tendency towards such articulation**—an inner tendency towards perfecting itself in action and practical knowledge—**is what marks practical thought out as rationally efficacious;** that is, **as practical.** It is in the nature of the thought ‘I want (aspire, intend) doing A’ and realizes that articulation in action and practical knowledge: ‘I am doing D by doing C by doing B by doing A’. Such inner efficacy is absent in mere wish”

Even an intention driven theory still cares about this distinction. There must be some relevant feature to identify an intention as an intention to do something, so all accounts of moral agency require an understanding of practicality. When alienated, you lose track of the practical component of action, aims come to be regarded as wishes rather than intentions since you don't have to demonstrate sufficient capability to bring about your end.

**Second**, only a non-alienated view accounts for first person authority. Practical knowledge allows one to know the success of an action because you can know what you have done by doing it. Moran[[4]](#footnote-3)

In several places, Anscombe speaks of **‘practical knowledge’ of what one is currently doing,** where this is contrasted with, e.g. visual aids to knowledge and action. Examples include the knowledge that I am painting the wall yellow (p. 50), opening the window (p. 51), pushing the boat out (p. 54), and the knowledge of what one is writing without looking (p.53 and p.82). What is striking is that in these examples of ordinary actions, essential referenceis made to events taking place *outside* the boundaries of the person’s body, and yet Anscombe insists that *this* sort of knowledge of ‘what I am doing’ **is** *also***not based on observation.** I have argued that my knowledge of what I do is not by observation. A very clear and interesting case of this is that in which **[when] I shut my eyes and write something. I can say what I am writing.** And what I say I am writing will almost always in fact appear on the paper. Now here it is clear that **my capacity to say what is written is not derived from any observation.** In practice of course, what I write will very likely not go on being very legible if I don't use my eyes; butisn’t the role of all our observation-knowledge in knowing what we are doing like the role of the eyes in producing successful writing? That is to say, **once given that we have knowledge** or opinion **about that matter in which we perform intentional actions, our observation is merely an aid**, as the eyes are an aid in writing (p. 53)

In acting you can know what you are doing without observation; this entails that the action you are doing and your decision about what is good are contained in the same reality, as to decide to X is take action X. An alienated perspective can never account for this as an intention doesn't necessarily correspond to an action. However, if you only knew your actions through observation in the same way everybody else knew them, you would lack foreknowledge, and would thus obviously not be morally responsible.

This justification outweighs all neg framework arguments. Independent of the action component, if we cant account for the practical component of first person authority, then we could never account for thinking or justification as any judgment would be suspect to the question “how do you know you think that.” Normally that question can be answered practically by expressing that I know I think because I am thinking, but without the AC distinction the question becomes unanswerable, yielding a problem to any theory of thinking or justification.

**Third**, my framework outweighs as regardless of any role of the ballot, nonalienation comes first. To make claims about the structure and shape of the activity relies on the initial assumption that debaters and the debate community more generally have the ability to structure our activity practically how we want it to be. We already must presuppose that debate is an institution with norms and rules because we think they are good. This entails that any higher level deliberation about what rules to impose, what judges should do, or how the ballot should function already relies on the AC premise. Otherwise, any arguments about the structure of debate would be question begging since we wouldn't have the authority to make claims to what the activity should look like. This entails an apriori assumption of nonalienation. Satisfying nonalienation necessarily co-opts any external role of the ballot or theoretical rule as they already rely on a nonalienated premise. The AC framework comes as a precondition to evaluating pre-fiat norms of debate.

**I contend that the living wage rectifies conditions of alienation.** Current wage systems misunderstand the role of the economy. Agents come to view the economy purely theoretically, as something that exists that we have to adapt to. This fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the economy as a practical institution designed to help society.

**First,** the market system of wages yields a problem as it subjects wages to simple rates of supply and demand. This is problematic since we take the outcome of wage negotiations to be governed by simple market forces rather than normative considerations of what people should get. This alienates the workers, as their work is not in line with their teleological goals. A disruption of these theoretical economic laws by a focus on the needs of individuals is necessary. Wills[[5]](#footnote-4)

The question arises, then, of how that teleology is disrupted, and how it comes to be the case that **economic laws, rather than human beings, govern production.** This result comes about **as human** being**s produce** and **regularities** begin to **appear** within that totality of human activity- regularities that are neither fully understood nor controlled,and which come to develop the appearance of external laws of production. Thus, **a world which human** being**s** have **produced** actually **appears** to be **independent** from and hostile to human beings(we can say, **human beings become alienated from** their own product, **the social world**)**.** The essence of social being, which is the labor process as **conscious life activity, is mediated by social forms so that it no longer appears as the product of** conscious life activity and the developing complex of **teleological goal positing** and production by concrete human individuals. Instead, it actually comes to defeat the teleological aspect which is a normal part of the labor process and of conscious life activity. (For an example of this, one might consider the demonstrated impotence of humanity at this point in history, dominated as it is by the profit motive, to address the environmental crisis which threatens to wipe out mankind on Earth altogether. Even the most simple, basic aim of human beings to safeguard their continued survival is thwarted by social arrangements that inhibit the ability of humans to act rationally and effectively in accordance with that goal.) **The solution to this disruption**, Marx thinks**, is to bring the appearance of social being into accordance with its essence. This means that production must be brought under the rational, conscious control of human beings.** And for that to occur, without regularities in human production taking on the appearance of social laws, social production must be coordinated socially,and directed not towards profit, but towards the creation of a society in which the free development of each is the precondition of the free development of all.

The living wage restructures the nature of the wage system by deriving wages based on practical considerations of what humans need rather than theoretical judgments of what happens.

**Second,** The living wage uniquely avoids alienation by deviating from the conventional wage as a price theory. Figart[[6]](#footnote-5) et al 02

**Public policy discussions offer** a rare **opportunity to examine the underlying assumptions about wage setting** during a particular historical period. During debates over wage regulations and practices, economic actors often pause to articulate implicit wage theories, that is, what they see as the basis for setting wages. These implicit wage theories affect wage outcomes directly, as these same actors (employers, unions, etc.) interact in labor markets. Wage theories also operate indirectly. Succinctly, implicit wage theories affect wage regulations which, in turn, affect wage-setting processes. Although, in the final analysis, wages may be set by firms interacting with employees or employee organizations, these market transactions are embedded in a social fabric constituted by such institutions as the state and families. Therefore, we view the process of wage setting as something that can be studied at the macro and meso (organizational, institutional) levels as well as the micro. Our research is meant to supplement microeconomic studies of wages, not supplant them. Wage setting, we argue, is a deeply political and cultural, as well as an economic, process. By recognizing that **wages serve multiple functions and contain multiple meanings,** we can better grasp the complexity of wage-setting processes. We identify three implicit **wage theories [can focus on]** in twentieth-century debates over regulations in the United States: **wages as a living, [or wages] as a price**, and as a social practice. **By wages as a living** we mean the argument that **the purpose of the wage is to provide an adequate level of support for the worker** (and, for some theorists, her dependents as well). Arguments for wages as a living were particularly prevalent among classical political economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and continue to be espoused by political economists and political activists up to the present. **Wages as a price focuses on the equality between remuneration and an employee’s contribution to production.** In addition, **this intellectual construct treats the wage-setting process as analogous to that of any other commodity price, as an amount arrived at through the workings of supply and demand** in the marketplace. While all schools of economic thought recognize the role of markets in wage setting, a narrow focus on wages as a price is primarily characteristic of mainstream, neoclassical economics

**Third,** To regard the economy in a nonalienated way, as a practical institution, needs to recognize that the economy is structured in a particular way to serve the human good. The economy is not just a fact; it is designed to serve constitutive features of human activity. Lott[[7]](#footnote-6)

We begin with the idea of **[an economy is] a cooperative system of labor and exchange, directed at the production and distribution of the goods necessary** and useful **for living** – i.e., an economy. In forming and sustaining such a system, the participants aim to attain the means of life. It is characteristic of human beings to form a system of this sort. **On her own, each person cannot get what she needs for living, and humans secure what they need through cooperative productive activity.** They divide up the tasks of labor, and they distribute the goods produced. They exchange goods and services, each party providing something valuable to the other. **When human beings form an economic system to attain the means of life, their aim is not to secure a “mere life” of bare subsistence** and biological functioning. **Rather they aim to secure the goods necessary for living well.** They engage in economic activity for the sake of the good life, the life of flourishing activity consistent with human dignity**.** For this reason,we are not satisfied with an economic arrangement if it makes possible for us only a life of subsistence**.** We regardan economy a[i]s defective qua economy if it fails to provide its members with the possibility foractivities we judge central toa flourishing life– e.g., opportunities for creativity, leisure time with friends and family, music and dance, philosophy and scientific investigation. In making this claim about economic activity and the good life, I am making more than an empirical psychological claim about what, in fact, we humans aim at. On the hand, I do think thatit is a near universal truth that if an economy makes possible only “mere life” for its members, they will be dissatisfied with it as an economy. On the other hand, however, if an individual were to insist that all he wanted was bare subsistence, this would not refute my claim about human economic activity**.** My claim is thatit belongs to **“**the human” – i.e., is part ofthe characteristically good human life – to engage in a cooperative economic system for the sake of living well. If a person insisted he was satisfied with an economy of mere subsistence, this would be astrange sort ofhuman defect. It would amount, I think, to an indifference toward those activities that are essential to human flourishing. For if one is satisfied with an economy that fails to make possible such activities, then one is satisfied with not engaging in those activities. But since they belong to human flourishing, these are activities about which a human being ought not to be indifferent; such indifference is a defect of the rational will.

The economic idea of wages is where we articulate whether the economy is properly subservient to a nonalienated perspective. The question of whether the economy serves its function is answered by whether wages should be set by economic law or by an adaption to human living conditions. Lott2

Taking these points about the character and compensation of labor, and combining them with the aim of an economic system, it follows that **any economic arrangement is defective if its members** **must work in a degrading manner**, **or if their compensation is too meager for them to secure the means for a good human life. For** if either of these obtains, **then the system’s arrangement fails to secure for its participants the means of living well,** or it undermines their ability to enjoy those goods as parts of a decent human life. Since the aim of an economy is precisely to enable its members to live well, **such an arrangement fails by the internal standards of an economy.** That for the sake of which members act qua members is being denied to them. We can imagine situations, such as a natural disaster, in which the members of an economy are forced to toil under brutal conditions in order to survive. These persons are caught in a situation that is deficient from the perspective of human flourishing. They are suffering. Things are not going as they should with a human community. But in this case, there is no way the participants could order their arrangement to avoid the brutal conditions. In that sense, the source of the deficiency is external circumstances rather than the arrangement of the economy. However,an economic order can also be defective in the two ways identified, even when this result is avoidable**.** Let us set aside, then, defective situations due to external circumstances, and rather focus on situations in which there are sufficient resources to make it possible that no participants labor under degrading conditions, or receive inadequate compensation, but the system is nevertheless arranged in such way that some workers must accept these terms. Further, let us focus on cases in which: 1) terms of labor are arrived at through bargaining between workers and employers in a “labor market”; 2) the workers depend upon their wages for securing the means of life; 3) each worker has one principle job, or source of employment. None of these are essential to a human economy as such.A cooperative system of production and distribution, involving the division of labor and the exchange of goods and services, might not have any of these specific features.11 However, focusing on economies with these features is not arbitrary. On the contrary, purported instances of labor exploitation in our world take place largely in economies with these features, and so that will be my focus here. Since economic arrangements that [can] failaccording to the two norms I have identified are inimical to human flourishing, why might **such defective arrangements** arise and **remain in place [because]**, even with this avoidable with regard external circumstances? Among the reasons, one stands out: **the arrangements benefits other members of the economy**. **In particular,** it benefits **the employers, with whom workers must bargain to set the terms of labor.** People are asked to accept work in humiliating conditions because it will secure some (perceived) good for someone else who is able to gain from their labor.And people do not want to compensate others at a higher level because that means that they will have to pay more. So it is not just that the system is arranged to generate avoidable deprivations for some participants, but those deprivations correspond directly to benefits for other participants.

**Fourth,** wages doesn't just materially help individuals – wages can have moral significance. Adopting a living wage principle is adopting the idea that a wage should be an indication of basic moral worth not the outcome of economic forces. Rogers[[8]](#footnote-7)

Wage Rates and Self-Respect.—**Wages matter to our self-respect.** This point is straightforward, even commonsensical. As the Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow wrote in an influential study, “**Wage rates and jobs are not** exactly **like other prices and quantities. They are much more deeply involved in the way people see themselves, think about their social status, and evaluate whether they are getting a fair shake out of society.”**153Wages are, of course, a primary means through which individuals meet their material needs. But the relationship between wages and respect runs deeper than resources per se since money is a dominant primary good in our society, one “readily converted into prestige and power.”154Wages measure the value of our work, and signify our place within the class and status structure.155 At one extreme, societies have long dealt with the worst sorts of hard and dirty work by assigning it to “degraded people,” ranging from slaves, to “‘inside’ aliens like the Indian untouchables,” to racial minorities, and, of course, to women, all of whom have been understood not to deserve decent wages, or even any wages at all.156 Given the all-too-recent historical context of slavery and serfdom, **the very payment of wages is a powerful indication of workers’ moral equality.** Outside such extreme examples,low-wage employment is often painful, involving “violence—to the spirit as well as to the body.”157 While not all workers risk physical injury, most still must submit to their employer’s unilateral direction, often in jobs that carry little creativity and little hope of advancement. Minimum wage laws compensate workers, however partially, for the difficulties and indignities of such work. Granted, money is an imperfect compensation for nonpecuniary harms, but it is important nevertheless.Higher wages enable workers to enjoy a higher material standard of living and perhaps to work less and spend more time on leisure. They also give tangible form to the moral equality between workers and employers**.** Every pay period, minimum wage workers receive a check from their employer for an amount greater than they would otherwise have received. This can have a profound effect on workers’ view of their place in society: for example, after a 1999 living wage ordinance raised his wage nearly $2 per hour, a janitor at the Los Angeles airport remarked that, while he and his coworkers still did not make much money, “at least now with the living wage, we can hold our heads up high.

Underview Neg must defend a competitive policy proving the converse of the resolution; namely that just governments ought not mandate a living wage. The neg must defend price theory as contextualized in Figart et al. Prefer this interp: A) Reciprocity: only my interp forces the debate to a one to one burden. Alternative interps give neg access to infinitely more options than the aff where they can read any counterplan, kritik, or justify permissibility. B) Topic Lit: The overwhelming underlying issue on living wage debates is this clash. This topic offers unique capacity to discuss. Leonard[[9]](#footnote-8)

**Disagreements among economists rarely breach the academy’s walls. The recent minimum-wage controversy is a significant exception.** At first glance, all the sound and fury is a puzzle.1 Minimum-wage effects, at least for current U.S. magnitudes, are small potatoes.2 Of several more important policy concerns—entitlement reform, health insurance, CPI calculation, for example—none has generated anything like the vituperation that has characterized the minimum-wage controversy. But if the minimum-wage controversy is not especially important to the economy, it is very important to economics, and, thereby, to the status of economics as a policy science. The reason, I want to argue, is that **the core of modern economics**— neoclassical **price theory—is seen to be at stake. In particular, minimum wage research has come to be seen as a test of the applicability of** neoclassical **price theory to the determination of wages** and employment**. The modern** minimum-wage **controversy is not just a technical quarrel over the** sign and **magnitude of wage-elasticity coefficients; it is** the latest chapter in **a longstanding methodological dispute over** whether and in **what domains** neoclassical **price theory can be said to properly apply.** One does not make opposition to minimum wages a disciplinary litmus test, unless there is something this important at stake.3 The modern minimum-wage controversy engages economists because it brings to light methodological issues ordinarily submerged in the course of normal science. I present a history of the economics of minimum wages designed to illuminate two such issues: (1) does prevailing theory explain and predict the determination of wages and employment, and (2) by what means do economists decide when explanation and prediction are successful? The history—really three vignettes—is designed to show, first, that the current debate is a modern-dress version of an old family argument in economics. Second, it provides some evidence for my claim that the minimum-wage controversy is not merely a substantive disagreement among labor specialists, but also a recurring touchstone for methodological debate about the application of economics.

C) neg positions utilizing wages as a living co-opt the core aff literature and mitigate aff unique offense. Also links to education: debates about specific policies can happen on any topic. This topic is unique in that it allows us to discuss the underlying philosophical issues of our economy.

ADDITIONAL FW WARRANTS:

First, moral agency requires interacting with the material world to pursue our projects. One who only intends or wills without practical action fails to be a moral agent. Ford[[10]](#footnote-9)

To begin, **imagine a man drifting somewhere deep in outer space** or floating in a large vat of warm transparent jelly. Though otherwise utterly destitute,he would have, at least, his power of choice| the treasure of any Stoic. Meanwhile, because **he could form an intention**, he would also have what is sometimes called \freedom of the will" as well as the power to introspect and (we may suppose) a clear moral conscience. Not only that, **he might retain a knowing control of his body**. For, in addition to his motor skills, he might retain the proprioceptive knowledge ofthe position of his limbs, the kinesthetic knowledge of their motionand, with these, \bodily sensation," the power to feel things pain, pressure, itches, etc. “in" specific parts of his body. **Given all this, he could perform the actions perennially given as** classroom **examples of agency**: he might raise his arm, or clench his fist, or bend his leg, or blink. And though nothing would prevent him from performing these actions all at once, he might also form a complex plan to do them in sequence, at which point he might engage in practical reasoning, deliberating about the most efficient (or graceful, or funny, or pious) order in which to do them. And as he carried out his plan, he might know that he was doing so, perhaps without observation, and his knowledge might be the cause of what was known. Here we see the `embodied agent' the hero of corporealism in all his shining splendor.Not one of his vaunted powers has been withheld**.** That **his actions seem, nevertheless, little more than gestures,** that he may as well be a mime, and that the skill of a Marcel Marceau could never restore what is missing, shows that we are dealing with an impoverished conception of agency. Meanwhile, its poverty is of a classic form: **the agent** we have just imagined **is estranged from others** like himself **and also from anything else.** The illustration serves to highlight two structural features of corporealism. The \_rst has to do with the agent's relation to others. Because it expels all transactions from the primary sphere of agency, corporealism expels a fortiori all transactions between human beings. For instance, the primary sphere ex- cludes any form of linguistic communication (e.g., telling someone something, teaching someone something, and asking or advising or ordering someone to do something). It also excludes any form of social cooperation. Thus, the chasm that separates bodily movement from its mere e\_ects equally separates each of us from anybody else. In fact, the agent's isolation is so extreme that there needn't be anybody else. Corporealism explains its basic concepts|intention , freedom , motor skill , proprioception , kinesthesis , spontaneity , practical reason-ing , practical knowledge , etc.|entirely egocentrically, by reference to the agent's own body. Nothing in the theory requires (or even anticipates) the existence of a second person. This conception of agency is therefore incompatible with one extremely modest claim that ought to appeal to any philosopher bold enough to mention alienation: namely, that relations between human beings might play some role in constituting the nature of human agency.The second point concerns the status of extra-corporeal objects. As to their existence, the corporealist adopts the same cool agnostic posture that Laplace took to the existence of God: it is a hypothesis of which he has no need. The corporealist does not need the `hyopthesis' of extra-corporeal objects to give his account of the basic concepts of action theory, since these are all de\_ned by relation to the body. He does not need it to explain primitive action, since this is simply bodily movement. And he does not need it to state his position on non-primitive action, since his position is purely hypothetical and commits him only to thinking that if the agent's bodily movement should happen to cause a further event, then the latter is also the agent's doing. Obviously, the relevant condition might never be ful\_lled. If it were not|because, say, the universe was empty but for one embodied agent|corporealism could stand without revision. Hence, we are o\_ered a theory of agency on which it makes no di\_erence, one way or the other, whether the acting subject inhabits an empty universe. By virtue of its agnosticism on the question of extra-corporeal objects, the theory entails that nothing belonging to the nature of human agency depends on any relation between the agent and anything else.Up till nowit has been assumed that the [agent]hero of corporealism is “at one" with his own body. But his relation to his body must itself be rather strange, given his estrangement from the rest of material reality**.** To see why, return to the man who was drifting in space or floating in a vat, and, in addition to his other powers, let him now absorb the teaching of corporealism that is, let it become his own self-understanding. **As he now conceives of his power to act,** it is only a happy accident if he ever encounters anyone or anything apart from himself;thus, none of his practical expectations are disturbed by his current predicament**.** But **how does he understand the fact that he has a pair of hands? The thought that his hands are for**, say, **picking things up, would only be intelligible if it were assumed that there is**, or should be, **something laying around**, and our hero assumes no such thing. From his point of view, the function of his hands could only be to touch, grab, push, pull, rub, caress, hit or pinch the other parts of his body. For such purposes, as he surely will have realized himself, a matching pair of highly sensitive prehensile appendages is rather excessive: one would have succeeded. Meanwhile, a darker mystery surrounds swirls around his feet, which, by comparison with his hands, have a very limited range of motion and no opposable digits. What could they possibly do? And why are at on the bottom? He could not think his feet were for walking, or even for standing still, as he does not take for granted any resistant surface. Then are they just for looking at, and are his legs, as it were, pedestals? Since he also assumes nothing about others like himself, what does he make of the fact that he has a voice, genitalia and a belly-button? Why does he have eyes? And why are his eyes so close to his nose? And why are they all so close to his mouth? And anyway, what is a mouth? Why is it full of teeth? Why do his arms bend toward it? Why do his legs bend away from it? What is it all for? And what is moving for, as he himself now understands it? To take just one example,why should he ever exercise his celebrated power to raise his own arm? It could not be in order to raise a question, or to cast a vote, or to bid at auction, or to demonstrate human agencybefore a classroom of philosophy students. Then what end could it serve? True, it might feel pleasant. And it might even stave o\_ madness and the atrophy of his muscles. But things being what they are for him, one struggles to see the good in that. Clearly**, a human body is for a world apart from the human body, and human bodily movement is for transacting with that world.** Thus, **a conception of human agency that does not represent `the body,'** or `bodily movement,' or `motor skills,' or `kinesthesis' **as having an internal relation to other people and other things is an alienated conception of embodiment itself.** Because materialism is not agnostic about the extra-corporeal world, because it includes transaction within the primary sphere of agency, and because it explains its basic concepts by reference to the agent's relation to other people and other things, it does not suffer from alienation.

To represent yourself as an agent, you must think of yourself as having the ability to do something. The most fundamental example is the idea of the limb. You must have primary control over your interactions with the world to hold onto a coherent notion of agency. Agency is meaningless without the ability to practically engage, as your material ability to affect the world is constitutive of the agency.

**Second**, action requires practical causation through practical knowledge. Rodl[[11]](#footnote-10)

**Deriving an action from a law is acting according to a representation of this law.** Analogously, deriving an action from an end is acting according to the representation of that end. Deriving an action is acting. Reason in general is the power to derive; the power to derive an action is practical reason. If deriving an action is acting, then practical reason, being a power to derive action, is a power to act, namely the power to act according to a general representation. To form the idea of practical reason, we must see why deriving an action is acting. First we consider acting according to the representation of an end, then acting according to the representation of a law.**A representation according to which someone acts causes her action: when someone is doing A according to her representation of doing B, then *she is doing A because she wants to do B*. But this does not suffice.** Someone’s wanting to do something may cause all manner of movement on her part, which will not on that account alone be a case of acting according to the representation. **For example, someone may be falling ill because he wants to lose weight,** in this way: he has been wanting to lose weight for a long time, nothing he tried has worked, at last his anxiety manifests itself in somatic symptoms. **As he falls ill, he does not act according to his representation of losing weight.** It is obvious what is missing: **if he is to act *according to* his representation, he must recognize that his action *accords* with his representation.** He must subsume his action under the representation; in the given case, he must see that it serves the represented end. But even with this, we have not yet captured acting according to a representation. **It is conceivable that the man recognizes that he is losing weight on account of his illness.** Indeed, he may welcome his illness as helping him reach his end of losing weight. **Still, he does not act according to his representation. Acting according to a representation requires causality of the representation, and requires the subject’s recognition that his action accords with the representation.** But these conditions, taken together, are not sufficient, as our example shows. It would be wrong to conclude that we must seek a further condition. We do not miss some third thing, but the unity of the two given things. **In the example, causality and recognition have come together per accidens: it is not internal to the truth of the explanation, “He is falling ill because he wants to lose weight”, that he recognizes that his falling ill accords with his end of losing weight.** His recognition is an independent reality from the one that the explanation records. Consider by contrast the person who is going upstairs because she wants to fetch the camera. We can concoct a story in which the fact that she is going upstairs because she wants to fetch the camera is independent of her recognition of the instrumental nexus of going upstairs is a way to fetch the camera. She subsumes her going upstairs as a means under this end. Her subsuming the action is an act of practical reason and an act of deriving the action, if it constitutes the causality of her representation of the end, the causality represented by the explanation, “She is going upstairs because she wants to fetch the camera”. **The concept of action according to a representation signifies a special kind of causality, a causality constituted by the subject’s joining its terms in thought.** The subject’s recognition of the accord of the action with the representation that is its cause is not added to an independently constituted causality; it is *the form of the causality*. Practical reason is not a term in causal relations of a kind that also characterizes the movements of non rational animals and inanimate substances**. Practical reason is *inside* a causality that therefore is characteristic of the movements of a rational subject.**

If you lack a conception of practical causation, then there is no conception of action or an ideal of agency. Any moral evaluation could be applied merely accidentally. You can only have practical causation from the AC framework distinction. Practical causation is merely the idea that one can have some special knowledge of an object via practical knowledge.

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10. Anton Ford, *The Province of Human Agency,*  [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. Rodl, *Why ought implies can,*  [↑](#footnote-ref-10)